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In constructing online alternative finance instruments as a new form of financial 
democratization and financial inclusion, this article aims at verifying the presence of 
similarity effect in equity crowdfunding investments. Discussion focuses on ethnic and gender 
similarity between the seekers and investors that sustained the project. Our analysis is based 
on 5,996 personal investors that have participated in 81 equity crowdfunding campaigns, on 
Crowdcube, a British equity crowdfunding platform from 2011 and 2016.  
Results show that in equity crowdfunding gender and ethnic similarities play different role 
based on investors’ characteristics - gender, ethnicity and the combination of two. In 
particular, ethnic similarity positively influence the level of amount invested by both female 
and male investors belonging to an ethnic minority. Even if female investors tend to prefer 
male company, their preference changes if a female proponent belonging to an ethnic 
minority runs the company.  
From a practical perspective, our findings shed new light on how individual characteristics 
can be important factor in financing situations. Results allow entrepreneurs and equity 
crowdfunding platforms to understand better potential investor behaviour and highlights the 
role of equity crowdfunding as tool for minorities’ financial inclusion and women 
entrepreneur empowerment.   
Keywords: equity crowdfunding, entrepreneurial finance, ethnicity, gender, similarity effect 
JEL classifications: G02 G11 G41 M13 
 
  
                                                     
* 
Department of Economics Marco Biagi - University of Modena and Reggio Emilia and CEFIN – 
Centro Studi Banca e Finanza at the University of Modena and Reggio Emilia. Email: 
valeria.venturelli@unimore.it 
† 
National Institute for the Analysis of Public Policy (INAPP) and Department of Economics Marco 
Biagi. Email: giovanni.gallo@unimore.it 
‡ 




Equity crowdfunding has been a rapidly growing financial instrument since 2012 when the 
financial crisis have worsened the problem of fundraising for small and medium size 
enterprises (SMEs) and innovative firms creating room for the development of new financial 
tools and intermediaries.  
Compared to other forms of crowdfunding - donation-based, lending based and reward-based 
- equity crowdfunding is still in its infancy but due to the rapid growth of the market, 
regulators and policy makers from different countries are paying a great attention on this 
relatively new phenomenon. Thanks to the web context in which crowdfunding is developed, 
crowdfunding is expected to democratize funding by increasing the availability of capital to 
traditionally underrepresented groups and by enabling entrepreneurs to enlarge their appeal 
for investments (Barasinska and Schäfer, 2014).  
Currently, studies on equity crowdfunding especially focus on the characteristics of the 
seekers side detecting which drivers influence campaign success (Ahlers et al., 2015; 
Lukkarinen et al., 2016; Vismara 2016a; Vismara, 2016b). From the supply side, much of the 
prior scholarly research about investors concentrated effort in ascertaining motivation to 
participate in crowdfunding campaign (Gerber et al., 2012). In reward and donation based 
platforms, in particular, investors are driven to fund projects by intrinsic motives, such as 
social reputation, shared identity, or other non-pecuniary benefits, whereas those on equity-
based platforms are driven predominantly by extrinsic – financial - motivation 
(Schwienbacher and Larralde, 2010; Ordanini et al., 2011; Cholakova and Clarysse, 2015 ) or 
a combination of both extrinsic and intrinsic drivers (Collins and Pierrakis, 2012). Little is 
known about investor characteristics, from company and platform perspectives, a better 
understanding of them reduces the ex-ante search costs and facilitates the ex-post matching 
(Polzin et al., 2018). For this reason, the need arises of conducting research on the behaviour 
and individual characteristics of equity crowdfunding investors. 
As for investor individual characteristics few studies have addressed gender issues in 
crowdfunding. In a broad sense, from seekers side, women are less likely than men to engage 
in new ventures but from the supply side is important to understand if also in crowdfunding 
market a gender gap persists (Leitch et al., 2018). Compared to reward based crowdfunding 
where Marom et al. (2014) find that 44% of investors on Kickstarter are female, in investment 
based crowdfunding, equity and real estate, Hervé et al. (2016) show that 93% of equity 
crowdfunders are men, so crowdfunding investment market is not different from other 
financial markets like business angels and VC that are predominantly male-dominated (Brush 
et al., 2004, Harrison and Mason, 2007).  
Even if the equity crowd and entrepreneurs are mainly male, female entrepreneur are more 
likely to succeed at crowdfunding campaigns thanks to the support of other female backers 
(Greenberg and Mollick, 2015; Horvat and Papamarkou, 2017). In reward-based and equity-
based model Greenberg and Mollick (2015) and Vismara (2016c) refer to homophily theory 
and their researches show that there is a strong correlation between female gender of the 
entrepreneur and backers’ profile. 
Also ethnic profile is one of the element that may improve similarity effect and it may be 
crucial in generating trust and overcoming information asymmetry between investors and 
proponents. To the best of our knowledge, there are no study that try to combine gender and 
ethnic similarity in attracting investors on equity crowdfunding platforms. Our research aims 
at verify if the similarity effect increases the amount invested in the campaign by the single 
investor and different investor’s characteristics, also highlighting the relative role of similarity 
respect company and entrepreneur characteristics. Toward this end, we collected shareholders 
information for 81 equity crowdfunding campaigns posted on Crowdcube, a British Platform, 
from 2011 to 2016.  
We collected firms information about the campaign from the Crowdcube website while 
shareholders information - name and amount invested - from documents filling hosted on 
Companies House website (companieshouse.gov.uk). We identify investors’ gender we use 
the genderize.io tool while ethnical origin by surname geographic distribution detached 
through forebears.io, a genealogical source. 
Our data show that in equity crowdfunding gender and ethnic similarities play different role 
on the basis of investors characteristics - gender, ethnicity and the combination of two. In 
particular, ethnic similarity positively influence the level of amount invested by both female 
and male investors belonging to an ethnic minority. Even if female investors tend to prefer 
male company, their preference changes if the company is run by a female proponent 
belonging to an ethnic minority. Among the aspect that influence the variability of the total 
amount invested, entrepreneur profile and company aspects are the most effective dimensions; 
nonetheless, also gender and ethnic similarity play a role in determine the total amount 
invested. 
Crowdfunding is an unbounding market thanks to the web context in which it is developed 
that allows entrepreneurs to enlarge their potential funding supply side. Our study offers 
relevant contribution especially for ethnic minority entrepreneurs and equity crowdfunding 
platforms to better understand potential investor behaviour and highlights the role of equity 
crowdfunding as tool for financial inclusion.  
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature and presents the 
research questions. Section 3 presents data, variables and summary statistics used in the 
empirical section. Section 4 presents and discusses the results of the similarity effect on the 
amount invested by the single investors, with a study of their concurring role in its 
determination. Section 5 is the robustness section where we control if the seriality of the 
investor influence the result obtained. Finally, Section 6 concludes and discusses some 
implications and future development of this study. 
 
2 “Similarity effect” in the investment process 
For “similarity effect” we refer to the tendency of the members of a group to display a 
preference for associating with other members of the same group. This tendency is often 
described as “birds of a feather flock together". This pure preference-based mechanism 
highlights the role of personal similarity breeding connection and is a basic organizing 
principle presents across a wide range of social interaction contexts (McPherson et al., 2001).  
In financial literature, similarity effect is justified, among others, by arguments concerning: 
soft information, trust, and personal social network (Ruef et al., 2003; Hegde and Tumlinson, 
2014; Bengtsson and Hsu, 2015; Hochberg et al. 2015). More generally in entrepreneurial 
finance, personal characteristics shared by seeker and investor reduces the cost of found and 
facilitates collaborations (Gompers et al., 2016; Alsos and Ljunggren, 2017). The influence of 
similarity biases is also important for understanding how venture capitalists decide whether to 
invest in specific companies. Several studies (Franke et al., 2006; Bruns et al., 2008; 
Murnieks et al., 2011) conclude that they tend to look more favourably at teams that have 
professional experience, human capital, ways of thinking similar to themselves. 
Lazarsfeld and Merton (1954) distinguished two types of homophily: status homophily, in 
which similarity is based on informal, formal, or ascribed status, and value homophily, which 
is based on values, attitudes, and beliefs. Status homophily includes principal 
sociodemographic dimensions like race, ethnicity, sex, or age, and acquired characteristics 
like religion, education, occupation, or behaviour pattern.  
Research in crowdfunding field focus especially on status homophily considering investors’ 
gender. In reward-based projects and in peer-to-peer lending, women are more likely to 
successful raise capital than male founders: female-led projects achieve a greater average 
pledge amount than male-led projects especially in sector whom they are historically 
underrepresented, as in the case for example of technological projects (Greenberg and 
Mollick, 2015). Female capital providers prefer to back projects founded by women due to 
choice homophily between female backers and entrepreneurs (Barasinska and Schäfer, 2014; 
Beier and Wagner, 2016; Marom et al., 2014) This result is confirmed also in case of equity 
crowdfunding campaigns. Vismara (2016c), analysing 58 equity offerings of UK 
crowdfunding platform Seedrs and comparing campaigns launched by firms with a female 
CEO with those launched by a male CEO, shows that on average, women invest 34 percent 
more than males. Therefore, the percentage of firms with a female CEO is higher in 
successful campaigns while the number of male investors is slightly higher in campaigns 
launched by male-led firms concluding that female investors strongly prefer firms led by 
females. Also Horvat and Papamarkou (2017) in their study on two UK equity crowdfunding 
platforms confirm on one hand that female-led campaigns enjoy higher success rate but on the 
other hand, they find that campaigns with higher participation rate from female investors tend 
to fail more at raising the target amount. 
Within status homophily dimensions also ethnicity plays an important role. Members 
representing districts with significant immigrant and ethnic minority populations are more 
likely to support their minority colleagues emphasizing solidarity within ethnicities (Aldrich 
and Waldinger, 1990; Ruef et al., 2003). Ethnic solidarity theorists focus on social dynamics 
that facilitates the mobilization of ethnic resources for economic advancement in explaining 
why some immigrant-minority groups achieve economic success despite societal hostility and 
initial disadvantages. Thanks to ethnic solidarity, the economic resources support the enclave 
economy that is composed of businesses lead by immigrant groups which are concentrated in 
a distinct spatial location and that serve their own ethnic market and/or the general population 
(Portes and Manning, 1986; Portes and Jensen, 1989).  
In VC selection process, a shared ethnicity between founder and VC increases the probability 
of an investment match and it has a high predictive power for early-stage investments (Hegde 
and Tumlinson, 2014; Bengtsson and Hsu, 2015) but it also influence the preference to 
collaborate with other venture capitalists (Gompers et al, 2016). Thanks to web context, 
crowdfunding can enlarge and facilitate the access to the pool of individuals with a similar 
ethnic characteristic. The similarity effect tend to get stronger as more types of relationships 
exist between two people, indicating that homophily on each type of relation cumulates to 
generate greater homophily (McPherson et al., 2001).  
In the framework of the above literature review, we develop three principal research 
questions:  
Rq1: To what extent gender and ethnic similarity affect the amount invested in the campaign? 
Rq2: Does the similarity effect change for different investors’ gender and ethnic origin?   
Rq3: Which is the relative importance of similarity effect on the variability of the amount 
invested in the campaign?  
 
3 Data and methods 
3.1 Sample 
We collected data from Crowdcube, the largest crowdfunding platform in Britain (Beauhurst, 
2017). Kaartemo, (2017) shows that that Crowdcube is relatively little researched in 
crowdfunding performance studies - mostly researchers have focused on Kickstarter that is a 
reward-based crowdfunding platform. Our sample includes the shareholder investors in 81 
equity crowdfunding campaigns posted on Crowdcube from October 2011 to the end of 
October 2016. These campaigns were successfully concluded, closed, and all investments 
collected. We restrict our attention to these campaigns since these were the ones that enable 
us to find out the number of shareholders and the individual amount invested in a consistent 
manner. 
We collected firm information about the campaign from the Crowdcube website. We were 
able to extract the name of investors and the number of shares subscribed by comparing 
information of the full list of shareholders from the model Annual Return, filled in accordance 
with Section 854 of the Companies Act 2006, at the date immediately before and immediately 
after the date of the campaign. The module AR101 is hosted in Companies House website. 
The price of the shares, when not disclosed directly in AR101 module, were obtained by 
dividing the amount collected during the equity crowdfunding campaign by the total number 
of shares subscribed by the investors during the campaign. The final sample includes 8,600 
investments made by 5,996 unique personal investors. The dataset covers a timeframe of six 
years, from 2011 to 2016. Our sample is a broad cross-section of companies, industries and 
ages at the time of the equity crowdfunding campaigns (Table 1).  
The average amount raised in our sample is £223,153, with a maximum of £1,9m and a 
minimum of £12,000. The average number of investors per campaign is equal to 106, the 
most crowded campaign involves 394 investors.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
3.2 Gender and ethnicity 
Gender  
Filled documents do not publish the gender of shareholders so to infer it we rely on automated 
methods. In our study we refer to genderize.io tool by comparing first names with a database 
including 86,710 distinct names across 81 languages (Greenberg and Mollick, 2015; 
Mohammadi and Shafi, 2017). The level of accuracy of this tool is 82%, the highest rate in 
the landscape of automated name-based gender detection methods widely used in scientific 
research (Karimi et al., 2016). Our final dataset includes 1,361 female users and 4,635 unique 
male investors. Also in the case of equity crowdfunding campaigns (Vismara, 2016c; Hervé et 
al.,2017) women investors are underrepresented; similar results hold also for venture and 
angel capital investments (Brush et al., 2004; Harrison and Mason, 2007). 
In terms of gender of the entrepreneur, 18 out of 81 campaigns are led by at least one female 
proponent, and finally 63 are companies in which the single or all the proponents are male. 
Co-gender cases, cases for which the gender of backers and proponents matches, (Table 3) 
count for nearly the 68% of the recurrences. In the 1,946 investments made in female-
companies, 21.8% of them (425) are associated to female investors. In the 6,654 investments 
made in male-companies, 82.3% of them (5,476) are associated to male investors. 
The average amount invested by female investors is lower than amount provided by male 
investors: 1,766£ vs 2,179£, male investors invest on average 19% more than female 
investors. The same conclusion can be drawn by analysing the median amount invested (200£ 
vs 263£). These figures are opposite from the average bid reported by Vismara (2016c) from 
Seedrs where female investors invest on average 34% more than man.  
Ethnicity 
When ethnicity refers to a group, it implies that members have some awareness of group 
membership and a common national background and culture (Yinger, 1985). If ethnicity is 
linked to business founding, it represents a set of connections and social structure among 
members of an ethnic group that are attached to one another and the ways in which those 
social structures are used (Aldrich and Waldinger, 1990). 
A number of different methodologies have been used to identify the ethnicity of the founder, 
from direct survey (Ruef et al., 2003; Wadwha et al., 2007; Hart and Acs, 2011), to post-
secondary educations in their biographies (Kenney and Patton, 2015) to its inference from 
individual names (Hegde and Tumlinson, 2014; Bengtsson and Hsu, 2015). For identifying 
investors’ ethnicity, we refer to this last methodology looking for individual's surname on 
forebears.io tool, a genealogical sources, which includes information on surname geographic 
distribution. Regarding the entrepreneur, we use information conveyed by the platform and 
visible to the investors at the time of equity crowdfunding campaign. There are two principal 
drawbacks in our study. On the one hand, we have only the proponent information rather than 
all team at the time of the firm’s founding, and thus the team question cannot be addressed 
directly. On the other hand, we cannot control for homonymy recurrences since we measure 
ethnicity coarsely, via surnames of individuals. 
Individual investors’ ethnicity is represented into 9 groups as follows
2
: African, Anglo-Saxon, 
Arabic, Asian, Oriental Bloc, European, Israelian, Southern Africa, Latin American. The 
same groups are used to identify proponents’ ethnicity. Studies highlight that applicants from 
certain ethnic minority communities appear to experience greater problems than others in 
accessing external finance, bank loans at start-up and to have a higher propensity to turn to 
non-bank formal sources of start-up finance (Ram et al., 2002; Smallbone et al., 2003; Clark 
and Drinkwater, 2010). To understand the potential of availability of capital to traditionally 
underrepresented groups we focus our study on two main investor groups: the dominant 
group, investors that belong mainly to British and European origin ethnic groups (Anglo-
Saxon, European, Oriental Block, Southern African ,Israelian) and the minority group, 
investors that belong to those that are considered underrepresented ethnic groups in the 
British and European financial market (Asian, African, Latin American, Arabic). The 
frequency for macro-ethnicity can be detached by analysing Table 2. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
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 Africa (Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Congo, Ethiopia, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, 
Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe), Anglo-Saxon (Australia, Canada, England, Ireland, Malta, New Zealand and 
Unites States), Arabic (Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, 
Syria, Tunisia, Turkey and United Arab Emirates), Asian (Bangladesh, Cambodia, China, India, Indonesia, 
Japan, Malaysia, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, North Korea, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Sri Lanka, 
Thailand and Vietnam), Eastern Bloc (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, 
Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan), Europe (Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece. Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland), Israel 
(Israel and Jordan), South Africa (South Africa and Swaziland), Latin America and Caribbean (Argentina, 
Barbados, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Mexico, Paraguay, 
Peru, Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela). 
In terms of ethnicity, most investors are of Anglo-Saxon origins (69.8%), followed by Asian 
(9.4%) and European (8.1%) ones. African, Latin American, Oriental, Southern African and 
Israelian together are 10% of the sample. Co-ethnicity cases, cases for which the macro-
ethnicity of backers and proponents are the same, (Table 3) count for nearly the 70% of the 
recurrences. Cases in which there is bot co-ethnicity and co-gender are 40% of the recurrences 
and where there is none of the two are 14% of the recurrences.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
These results are consistent with Vismara (2016c), which bases his analysis on Seeders, 
another English platform, and shows that most investors are based in the UK (82.8%) but the 
distribution of investors in other countries is different from what one would expect in 
entrepreneurial finance, so from a geographical standpoint, equity crowdfunding allow 
company to deliver investment opportunities to a diversified set of investors.  
 
 
3.3 Variable description 
There are several observed characteristics that enable us to evaluate the investment likelihood 
by gender and ethnicity after having controlled for company, campaign, entrepreneur 
characteristics and investor characteristics.  
In our analysis, we focus on the determinants of the amount invested by the crowd 
considering as dependent variables the logarithm of the amount invested by each investors in 
the equity crowdfunding campaign. 
Independent variables 
In the covariate group we consider three variables that explicit study the similarity between 
backers and proponents. In particular, gender similarity effect is proxied by the variable 
Gender Similarity which is a dummy variable equals 1 in case of gender similarity between 
backers and proponents. Ethnic similarity effect is proxied by the variable Ethnic Similarity 
which is a dummy variable equals 1 when backers and proponents share the same ethnicity. 
We also insert the interaction between ethnic and gender similarity - Gender & Ethnic 
similarity - is a dummy variable equals 1 in case of both gender and ethnic similarity between 
backers and proponents. 
Variables related to the entrepreneur profile principally deal with their gender and ethnicity 
characteristics. At least one female proponent is a dummy variable equals 1 in case of at 
least one female proponents among the overall numbers of proponents and zero otherwise. 
The ethnic profile is captured by the variable At least one ethnic minority proponent is a 
dummy variable equals 1 in case of at least one ethnic minority proponent in the company and 
zero for dominant ones.  
Control variables 
There are several variables that might influence the investment decisions of investors, for 
which we have to control for. Some of them refer to company features, other to campaign 
structure and finally to investor characteristics. 
Company features are insert in terms of firm age - the numbers of years from the firm’s 
establishment to the date of the campaign. On average, the firm in the sample are 2.3 years 
old. The sector of activity captured by the variable Innovative – dummy variable equals one 
in case of companies active in highly innovative sectors isolated, as in Nesta (2009), on the 
basis of SIC code3; 18 companies (22.2%) in our sample belongs to highly innovative sectors. 
Finally, we insert the variable Team size computed as the log of number of people listed on 
the Crowdcube site to make up the group of executive around the entrepreneur. Smaller team 
may be riskier since they might be more recent and a higher number of board members is 
related to the number of investors and the funding amount reached during the campaign 
(Ahlers et al., 2015, Horvat and Papamarkou, 2017). In our sample the average team is 
formed by 3.2 people.  
Campaign structure is proxied by the following variables. Equity offering the percentage of 
equity offered during the campaign. Equity offering can be considered as a proxy of firm risk 
for several reasons. On the one hand, signalling theory (Leland and Pyle, 1977) indicates the 
manager choice of raising equity as a negative signal for the investors since firms 
opportunistically choose to raise equity when managers know that their shares are overvalued. 
                                                     
3
64.20; 72.20; 72.30; Telecommunication, Computer Programming and Software Service Industries; 72.40; 
72.60; 73.10; Data Processing, Misc. Computer Services, R&D in Natural Sciences and Engineering; 30.01; 
30.02; 32.20; 32.30; Office Equipment; Computers and other Information Processing Equipment; Television and 
Radio Transmitters and Apparatus for Line Telephony and Line Telegraphy; Television and Radio Receivers, 
Sound or Video Recording and Reproducing Apparatus; 33.20; 33.30; 33.40 Electronic Instruments and 
Appliances for Measuring, Checking (except Industrial Process Control); Electronic Industrial Process Control 
Equipment; Optical Instruments; Photographic Equipment; 24.41; 24.42; 33.10 Pharmaceutical Products and 
Preparations; Medical and Life Sciences Surgical Equipment and Orthopaedic Appliances; 24.16; 24.17; 31.10; 
Plastics and Synthetic Rubber in Primary Form; Electric Manufacturing; 31.20; 32.10; 35.30. Motors, Generators 
and Transformers; Electricity Distribution and Control Apparatus; Electronic Valves, Tubes and other 
Components; Aircraft and Spacecraft Manufacturing. (Nesta, 2009). 
Likewise, an owner’s decision to offer a lower amount of equity can indicate less adverse 
selection risk in that a bad outcome is less likely to be perceived by owners (Ahlers et al. 
2015). Furthermore, greater equity offerings can dilute entrepreneurs’ incentive to commit to 
their firms. Altogether, more equity offering suggests that a firm is riskier (Mohammadi and 
Shafi, 2017). On average, firms in our sample offers nearly 18% of equity; more or less the 
same (18.6%) in terms of investments. Exit is a dummy variable equals 1 if the exit strategy 
is explicit in the campaign and zero otherwise. A planned exit strategy influences the success 
of the campaign, receiving a return on the money it is typically only attained through an exit 
or liquidity event, so the presence of an exit strategy could make a campaign more attractive 
(Ahlers et al., 2015). In our sample, 65 campaigns (more than 80% of the total) envisage at 
least one exit option.  
Finally, we control for the presence of serial investors in the sample and introducing the 
variable Serial investor that is a dummy variable equal to 1 for investors that have 
participated in more than one campaign and zero otherwise. The group of serial investors is 
29% of the investors in the sample and the amount invested by serial investors is on average 
794£. 
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4. Similarity effect and investment size 
We use Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression to evaluate if similarity patterns, both in 
terms of gender and ethnicity, increases the individual investor investment size (Table 5). The 
dependent variable is the log of amount invested by the individual investor in a single 
campaign for the overall sample (Mod. 1). We also test whether similarity effect are 
etherogeneous by gender and ethnic groups of the investors. We show estimates for the sub-
sample of female/male investors (Mod. 2/3), for the sub-sample of Dominant/Minority ethnic 
group investors (Mod. 4/5). Finally  for the combination of gender and ethnic group of the 
investors: female investors that come from a dominant/minority ethnic group (Mod. 6/7), 
male investors that come from a dominant/minority ethnic group (Mod. 8/9). 
𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑋 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜀      [2] 
[INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
For the full sample, estimation results show that gender and ethnic similarity individually 
have no significant effect on the amount invested, whereas we find that the coexistence of 
gender and ethnic similarity determines a 30% increase of the amount invested. Moreover, 
results highlight that the amount invested decreases of 40% when the campaign has at least 
one female proponent and conversely, the amount invested raises 41% when the campaign has 
a proponent belonging at one ethnic minority group. 
The amount invested in equity crowdfunding campaigns (Model 1) is higher in older 
company with a larger number of members in the team. Concerning the variables related to 
the campaigns, those that receive a larger invested amount state a presence of an exit strategy. 
The percentage of equity offered in the campaign is not significant. Thus, the level of amount 
invested do not change by campaign and company characteristics but there are differences 
when we consider investors’ and entrepreneurs’ characteristics.  
Serial investors confirm descriptive statistics that show a lower amount invested and high 
frequency of the investment regardless gender and ethnic origin of the investors considered. 
This investment behavior seem to be similar to a gambling strategy. 
For female investors (Model 2), gender similarity negatively affects the amount invested 
otherwise for male investors there is a positive effect (Model 3). In other words, it seems that 
male investors look at gender similarity is in incentive to invest a higher amount of money 
while the opposite holds for female investors. This result appears to be consistent with 
literature that suggest that women in male-dominated fields prefer to support members of the 
dominant group (Greenberg and Mollick, 2015). Also in the business angel market, research 
has demonstrated the tendency for women angels to refuse financing to women entrepreneurs, 
although they are more likely to seek funding from other women (Becker-Blease and Sohl 
2007). In case of male investors the interaction fosters the amount invested. Focusing to the 
comparison between female and male investors, it seems that there are no straight differences 
in the types of companies and campaigns characteristics that condition the size of investments 
(Models 2 and 3). The size of their investments increases in older companies, with larger team 
and when an exit strategy is considered. 
Similarly to the comparison by gender, results show different effects when we distinguish 
investors belonging to different ethnic groups (Models 4 and 5) and when we match both 
gender and ethnic group of investors (Models 6, 7, 8 and 9). In particular, ethjnic similarity 
have a negative effect on the amount invested by investors belonging to a dominant ethnic 
group while they have a positive effect on ethnic minorities. For investors that belong to an 
ethnic minority (Model 5) the presence of an ethnic similarity with the proponent seems to 
compensate other aspects of the campaign, for example: the team dimension and the absence 
of an exit strategy.  
Comparing female investors by their ethnicity group (Model 6 and 7) we find that both of 
them tend to invest significantly less when there is a female proponent but the overall 
similarity effect is over turned for female investors belonging to an ethnic minority group. In 
models 8 and 9, male investors that belong to the dominant ethnic group there is a negative 
and significant effect on the amount invested in company run by an entrepreneur of the same 
origin. For male minority, ethnic and gender similarity have a strong and positive effect on 
the amount invested but the overall similarity effect is reduced when this similarity appears 
together. This can be linked to the fact that for male minority investors the amount invested is 
lower in companies that are active in innovative sector and the most part of ethnic minority 
companies are innovative businesses.  
Results showed by heterogeneous effects indicate different trends for similarity effect and 
they depend on investors’ characteristics. 
About Rq1, it seems that similarity effect influence the amount invested by the individual 
investor and its result change according to investors gender and ethnic origin (Rq2). 
Nonetheless, the different covariates introduced, being heterogeneous, as confirmed by the 
variables’ descriptions, do not share a common unit of measure. This implies that their 
relative contribution can be observed uniquely in terms of their relevance, in a multivariate 
frame, to explaining a given object of analysis. 
To better point out their concurring role in the definition of the investment size, we 
investigate the importance and the relative contribution of different aspects that characterized 
an equity crowdfunding investment, for explaining the quantity of amount invested by the 
single investor. The characteristics identified can be associated to company, entrepreneur, 
campaign, investor and degree of similarity in terms of gender and ethnicity. Coherently, we 
model in equation (2) the relationship between the identified characteristics and the amount 
invested (in log). 
In the general equation (2) we follow a Shapley decomposition method (Shapley, 1953) that, 
since its introduction in game theory, permits distributing a goodness-of-fit measure of an 
econometric model among regressors. As a goodness-of-fit measure, we adopt the total R2-
value obtained from the OLS pooled estimations of equation (2). Since some attributes are 
formed by groups of variables, we use a generalization of the Shapley value, the Owen value 
(Owen, 1977), which allows decomposition in the case of exogenously grouped regressors, as 
suggested by Shorrocks (2013). Results of the Shapley and Owen value decomposition are 
reported in Table 6. 
[INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
 
As expected, being a serial investor has an important role in explaining the existing 
heterogeneity in the amount invested in the campaign and this is particular true for male 
investors both belonging to dominant or minority ethnic group (Table 6).  
Results underline the pivotal role that company characteristics have on the amount invested, a 
role nearly exclusively related to company’s age and structure of the team. Turning to the 
remaining characteristics, the overall R2 of the full sample can be explained mainly by two 
groups of characteristics: entrepreneur profile, linked to the presence of at least one female 
entrepreneur in the company, and the combination of gender and ethnic similarities between 
backers and proponents that condition the variability of the amount invested in an 
unneglectable manner (Rq3). Conversely, campaign features appears to be the weakest 
characteristics in terms of explanatory power with respect to the size of the investment.  
As in the previous analysis, we disaggregate our sample by investor gender and ethnic origin 
(Table 7). Female and male investors look at different aspects in the campaign. Even if 
company characteristics still remain the most important aspect that influence the variability of 
the  amount invested, female investors give more importance to the size of the team whereas 
male investors tend to increase the investment size in older companies. The similarity group 
represents a main aspect for all investor categories in particular for female investors for which 
in case of minority ethnic profile contributes for nearly 22% to the formation of the overall 
R2. For male that belong to an ethnic minority, gender similarity assumes the same 
importance of company age. The seriality profile strongly conditions the variability of the 
amount invested for male investors belonging to dominant ethnic group. This characteristic 
explains more the 55% of the variance of the amount invested.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE] 
5. Robustness 
Given the importance of the serial investors, we decide to verify if the investment behavior 
adopted by this kind of investors influence the overall previous results. 
Table 8 and Table 9 present the results of our estimations without considering serial investors 
in the sample. Our mains findings remain qualitatively unchanged and the stability of the 
coefficients in the model estimation confirm the robustness of our results.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 8 AND 9 ABOUT HERE] 
6. Conclusion 
This study explores the presence of ethnic and gender similarities between backers and 
proponents in equity crowdfunding investment investigating the relationship between 
similarity patterns and the size of investment. Our results show that similarity, in terms of 
both gender and ethnic matching between investors and proponent, is an important aspect in 
the investment decision but its effects change for the different investors’ characteristics. In 
particular, differently from reward based crowdfunding, female investors are less present in 
equity crowdfunding market and the size of female investment is lower than those of male 
ones. Female investors show a clear preference for male lead campaigns whereas male 
investors tend to support more male company; nevertheless in case of female entrepreneur 
belong to an ethnic minority receive the support of female investors sharing the same ethnic 
origin of the proponent. 
We find that equity crowdfunding appears to reduce constraints for founders that belong to an 
ethnic minority seeking capital, both for female and male investors the level of engagement in 
the campaign is higher if they share the same ethnic minority profile of the proponent. An 
ethnic match especially for ethnic minority group compensates other campaigns’ aspects, for 
example the number of people in the company’s team and the presence of an exit strategy. 
The combination of gender and ethnic similarities between backers and proponents conditions 
the variability of the amount invested in an unneglectable manner whereas campaigns’ 
characteristics appear to be not relevant.  
There are several advantages of this setting for studying the impact of gender and ethnic 
similarities in investment decisions. First, unlike much of the past work on this topic that 
mainly rests on gender profile, our results regarding ethnic similarity represents a novel in this 
field. Second, studying similarity effect in crowdfunding setting, contributes to a better 
understanding of the persistence of this phenomenon also in the web context and in online 
financing relationships.  
Finally, we contribute to the nascent literature in equity crowdfunding and financial inclusion 
related fields. Financial inclusion in fact, is defined as a state in which individuals or firms 
have effective access to financial products and services appropriate to their needs (Demirgüç-
Kunt et al., 2015). Equity crowdfunding appears to be a tool for a sustainable financial 
inclusion of ethnic minorities in the financial system, both from seekers and suppliers of 
capital. From seekers side, our study allows women and ethnic minority entrepreneurs to 
identify investors’ behaviours and characteristics that maximize fund raising opportunities 
through equity crowdfunding campaigns. From suppliers side we provide a snapshot of how 
women and ethnic minority perceive and invest in equity crowdfunding projects adopting a 
longitudinal perspective and contributing to theory building. For equity crowdfunding 
literature we show that the Investment decision in equity crowdfunding are driven not only by 
financial motivations but also by a similarity matching between proponent and investors.  And 
this is particular true for female investors belonging to an ethnic minority group. 
From a practical perspective, the results are relevant not only for female and ethnic minority 
but for all entrepreneurs, investors, and crowdfunding platforms alike, as understanding 
crowd composition and investment dynamics are in the interest of each group. Such 
knowledge may have a positive impact on the probability of campaign success, which 
especially for equity model, studies show different results (Lukkarinen et al, 2016). 
Due to a different result compared with reward based platform (Greenberg and Mollick, 2015) 
future researches could extend analysis to other platforms or compare different crowdfunding 
model (i.e.: reward based vs equity based) to understand: why in riskier situation female 
investors prefer male business? Or, do female investors prefer to support female companies 
only in a low risk context? In particular, about the emotional part of equity crowdfunding 
campaign, female and male investors may have different investment behaviour with words 
and language used to present the project.  Do ethnic minority and female entrepreneurs adopt 
specific words for promoting the crowdfunding campaign? We hope that future works could 
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Table 1 - Descriptive statistics 
Panel A: Sample overview Obs 
     
Number of companies (ECF campaigns) 81 
     
Number of investments made by personal investors 8,600 
     
Number of  investments made by female investors 1,603 
     
Number of  investments made by male investors 6,997 
     
Number of unique female investors 1,361 
     
Number of unique male investors 4,635 
     
Number of investments made by ethnic minority investors 1,568      
Number of investments made by ethnic dominant investors 7,032      
Number of investments made by a serial investors 2,526      
Number of unique ethnic minority investors 1,064      
Number of unique ethnic dominant investors 4,932      
Panel B: Summary statistics of key variables for companies Obs mean min median max sd 
Company age at the date of ECF (in years) 81 2.3 0.0 2.0 11.0 2.3 
Company sector Innovative (1=yes; 0= no) 81 0.22 
   
0.42 
Team size (number) 81 3.20 0.0 3 12 3.18 
Panel C: Summary statistics of key variables for campaigns Obs mean min median max sd 
Total amount raised (£) 81 223,153 12,000 139,900 1,962,730 223,153 
Total equity offer (in %) 81 17.7% 4.0% 16.8% 48.0% 0.08 
Exit strategies (1=yes; 0= no) 81 0.80 0 1.00 1.00 0.40 
Panel D: Summary statistics of key variables for entrepreneur Obs mean min median max sd 
Proponents (number) 81 1.3 1.0 1.0 3.0 0.5 
At least 1 female proponents  81 0.22 0 0 1.0 0.42 
At least 1 ethnic minority proponent 81 0.19 0 0 1.0 0.39 
Panel E: Summary statistics of key variables for investors  Obs mean min median max Sd 
Investors per campaign (number) 81 106 8 83 394 81 
Female investors per campaign (number) 81 20 1 12 125 24 
Fraction of female investors per campaign (%) 81 17.5% 3.6% 15.4% 45.6% 0.09 
Fraction of dollar amount female investors invested per campaign 
(%) 81 23.0% 1.7% 17.3% 50.6% 0.17 
Ethnic minority investors per campaign (number) 81 19 1 15 75 16.73 
Fraction of ethnic minority investors per campaign (%) 81 17.5% 6.3% 17.4% 35.5% 0.06 
Fraction of dollar amount ethnic minority investors invested per 
campaign (%) 81 19.9% 0.9% 18.8% 70.7% 0.16 
Dollar amount invested by personal investors (£) 8,600 2,102 0.23 250 1,394,612 16,186 
Dollar amount invested by female investors (£) 1,603 1,766 2.3 200 139,461 6,284 
Dollar amount invested by male investors (£) 6,997 2,179 0.23 263 1,394,612 17,690 
Dollar amount invested by ethnic minority investors (£) 2,666 1,724 5.00 200 96,666 5,499 
Dollar amount invested by dominant investors (£) 5,923 2,163 0.23 263 1,394,612 17,709 
Dollar amount invested by serial investors (£) 2,526 794 0.23 147 51,560 2,713 
 
Table 2 - Frequency of ethnicity groups in the sample 
Ethnicity 
Investors Proponents 
Obs % Obs % 
Dominant 
    
Anglo-Saxon 4.187 69,8% 77 73,3% 
European 484 8,1% 7 6,7% 
Oriental Block 176 2,9% 1 1,0% 
Southern African 63 1,1% 1 1,0% 
Israelian 22 0,4% 3 2,9% 
Minority 
    
Asian 562 9,4% 11 10,5% 
African 189 3,2% 2 1,9% 
Latin American 157 2,6% 1 1,0% 
Arabic 156 2,6% 2 1,9% 
Total 5.996 100,0% 105   
Table 3 - Gender similarity and ethnic similarity 
Panel A: Gender Similarity 






5.476 1.521 6.997 
82,3% 78,2% 81,4% 
Yes 
1.178 425 1.603 
17,7% 21,8% 18,6% 
Total 
6.654 1.946 8.600 
100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Panel B: Ethnic Similarity 






5.684 1.348 7.032 
82,4% 78,7% 81,8% 
Minority 
1.203 365 1.568 
17,6% 21,3% 18,2% 
Total 
6.887 1.713 8.600 
100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
    
Panel C: Gender and Ethnic 






1.254 2.414 3.668 
46,5% 40,9% 42,7% 
Yes 
1.445 3.487 4.932 
53,5% 59,1% 57,4% 
Total 
2.699 5.901 8.600 
100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
 


























Ln(Amount invested) 1 
          
Gender similarity 0.0711* 1                 
 
Ethnic similarity 0.0507* 0.0521* 1 
        
At least one female prop. -0.1072* -0.5451* -0.1146* 1             
 
At least one ethnic minority 
proponent 
-0,0175 -0.0774* -0.3634* 0.0664* 1 
      
Innovative -0.0316* 0.0261* 0,0074 -0.0941* -0.0269* 1         
 
Firm age 0.1310* 0.0275* 0.0327* -0.0339* -0.1944* 0,0052 1 
    
Team size -0.0959* -0.0865* 0,004 0.0845* 0.1346* 0.0946* -0.3396* 1     
 
Equity offering -0,0177 0,0068 -0.0976* -0.0233* 0.2650* -0.1909* -0.2601* -0,0202 1 
  
Exit -0.0286* -0.0434* -0.0265* 0.1405* 0.1124* -0,0179 -0.0542* 0.5604* 0.0787* 1 
 






Table 5 – Similarity effect by gender and ethnicity groups of investors 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 









Gender similarity -0.089 -0.677*** 0.236*** -0.296*** 0.288* -0.752*** -0.931*** 0.008 0.737*** 
 
(0.079) (0.180) (0.083) (0.095) (0.151) (0.213) (0.337) (0.101) (0.156) 
Ethnic similarity -0.049 0.116 -0.057 -0.435*** 0.696*** -0.105 0.136 -0.552*** 1.170*** 
 
(0.082) (0.136) (0.108) (0.093) (0.206) (0.148) (0.379) (0.125) (0.253) 
Interaction [gender & ethnic 
similarity] 
0.285*** 0.114 0.284** 0.510*** -0.259 -0.027 2.197*** 0.645*** -0.976*** 
(0.095) (0.239) (0.118) (0.111) (0.249) (0.270) (0.712) (0.140) (0.297) 









    
At least one ethnic minority 
proponent 
0.412*** 0.488*** 0.377*** 
      
(0.062) (0.156) (0.067) 
      
Innovative -0.088 -0.031 -0.089 -0.039 -0.374** -0.005 -0.298 -0.037 -0.368** 
 
(0.063) (0.158) (0.069) (0.069) (0.150) (0.175) (0.368) (0.075) (0.160) 
Firm age 0.122*** 0.073*** 0.132*** 0.121*** 0.104*** 0.083*** -0.010 0.130*** 0.130*** 
 
(0.010) (0.023) (0.011) (0.011) (0.024) (0.024) (0.058) (0.012) (0.026) 
Team size 0.245*** 0.191* 0.273*** 0.288*** 0.130 0.266** -0.120 0.333*** 0.281** 
 
(0.042) (0.114) (0.047) (0.047) (0.106) (0.121) (0.321) (0.054) (0.114) 
Equity offering 0.058 0.473 0.040 0.390 -0.360 1.148 -0.638 0.347 -0.291 
 
(0.273) (0.767) (0.294) (0.296) (0.657) (0.860) (1.747) (0.319) (0.707) 
Exit 0.697*** 0.838*** 0.686*** 0.795*** 0.070 0.999*** 0.035 0.776*** 0.179 
 
(0.134) (0.293) (0.150) (0.140) (0.426) (0.289) (0.861) (0.158) (0.485) 
Serial investor -0.799*** -0.739*** -0.862*** -0.748*** -0.967*** -0.580** -1.250*** -0.837*** -0.952*** 
 
(0.086) (0.219) (0.093) (0.101) (0.151) (0.255) (0.418) (0.109) (0.160) 
Constant 5.613*** 5.528*** 5.289*** 5.857*** 5.622*** 5.524*** 6.142*** 5.537*** 5.013*** 
 
(0.117) (0.255) (0.128) (0.135) (0.248) (0.308) (0.546) (0.146) (0.278) 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 8.600 1.603 6.997 7.032 1.568 1.336 267 5.696 1.301 
R-squared 0,098 0,121 0,100 0,089 0,140 0,115 0,224 0,092 0,144 
Adj. R-squared 0,096 0,114 0,098 0,087 0,132 0,107 0,188 0,090 0,136 
Notes: This table reports the results of a OLS regression. The dependent variable is the log of amount invested by the individual investor in a single campaign for the overall sample (Mod. 1), for 
the sub-sample of female investors (Mod. 2) and male investors (Mod. 3), for the sub-sample of dominant investors (Mod. 4), for minority investors (Mod. 5) and the combination of gender and 
ethinicty of the investors: female investors that belong to the dominant ethnicity (Mod. 6), female investors that belong to the minority ethnicity (Mod. 7); male investors that belong to the 
dominant ethnicity (Mod. 8) and male investors that belong to the minority ethnicity (Mod.9) . The following company features’ controls are included in the regression: Firm age is the the 
numbers of years from the firm’s establishment to the date of the campaign, Innovative is a dummy variable equals one in case of companies active in highly innovative sectors, Team size 
computed  as the log of number of people listed on the site to make up the group of executive around the entrepreneur. Two campaign structure controls are included as follows: Equity offering 
is the percentage of equity offered during the campaign, Exit is a dummy variable equals 1 if the exit strategy is explicit in the campaign and zero otherwise. The control variables related to the 
entrepreneur characteristics are the following: At least one female proponent is a dummy variable equals 1 in case of at least one female proponents among the overall numbers of proponents 
and zero otherwise, At least one ethnic minority proponent is a dummy variable equals 1 in case of at least one ethnic minority proponents among the overall numbers of proponents and zero 
otherwise. Variables related to the investor profile is Serial investor is a dummy variable equal to 1 for serial investors and zero for otherwise. Similarity effect rest on three variables: gender 
similarity effect - Gender similarity - is a dummy variable equals 1 in case of gender similarity between backers and proponents, ethnical similarity effect - Ethnic similarity - is a dummy 
variable equals 1 when backers and proponents share the same ethnicity and the interaction between ethnic and gender similarity - Gender similarity & Ethnic similarity - is a dummy variable 
equals 1 in case of gender and ethnic similarity between backers and proponents.All models include year-fixed effect dummies. The standard errors are robust and clustered around investors and 
are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
 




Ind. %R2 Group %R2 
Similarity 
Gender similarity 2,34 8,13 
Ethnic similarity 1,50            
Gender & Ethnic similarity 4,29            
Entrepreneuer 
characteristics 
At least one female proponent 12,68 13,41 
At least one ethnic minority proponent 0,74            
Company 
characteristics 
Innovative 1,44 30,06 
Firm age 19,03            
Team size 9,59            
Campaign 
characteristics 
Equity offering 0,19 1,12 
Exit 0,93            
Investor 
characteristics 
Serial investor 47,27 47,27 
 
 
Note: Under the general equation of (2), this table reports the fraction of the overall R-squared (per cent), explained by the 
different groups of characteristics  – Owen value (Gr) -  and the individual share (Ind) of the overall R-squared (per cent) 
associated with each variable belonging to a specific characteristic (Shapley decomposition). Note that these figures are 
median values within bootstrap percentile confidence intervals (level of confidence: 90%). This explains cases where Total is 
not always 100.00. 
The following company characteristics are included in the regression: Firm age is the the numbers of years from the firm’s 
establishment to the date of the campaign, Innovative is a dummy variable equals one in case of companies active in highly 
innovative sectors, Team size computed  as the log of number of people listed on the site to make up the group of executive 
around the entrepreneur. Two campaign structure characteristics are included as follows: Equity offering is the percentage of 
equity offered during the campaign, Exit is a dummy variable equals 1 if the exit strategy is explicit in the campaign and zero 
otherwise. The variables related to the entrepreneur characteristics are the following: At least one female proponent is a 
dummy variable equals 1 in case of at least one female proponents among the overall numbers of proponents and zero 
otherwise, At least one ethnic minority proponent is a dummy variable equals 1 in case of at least one ethnic minority 
proponents among the overall numbers of proponents and zero otherwise. Variables related to the investor characteristics is 
Serial investor is a dummy variable equal to 1 for serial investors and zero for otherwise. Similarity effects rest on three 
variables: gender similarity effect - Gender similarity - is a dummy variable equals 1 in case of gender similarity between 
backers and proponents, ethnical similarity effect - Ethnic similarity - is a dummy variable equals 1 when backers and 
proponents share the same ethnicity and the interaction between ethnic and gender similarity - Gender similarity & Ethnic 
similarity - is a dummy variable equals 1 in case of gender and ethnic similarity between backers and proponents. Year 
fixed effects are not considered in the model. 
Table 7 – Shapley and Owen value decomposition of R2 by investors characteristics 
Group Variable 
Owen value 
Female Male Dominant Minority 





Gender similarity 21,60 27,74 7,32 15,64 2,32 8,82 4,78 7,30 
Ethnic similarity 0,93            2,34            1,15            1,69            
Gender similarity & Ethnic 
similarity 
5,21            5,99            5,35            0,84            
Entrepreneuer 
characteristics 
At least one female proponent - - - - 15,41 15,41 5,95 5,95 
At least one ethnic minority 
proponent 
2,09 2,09 0,68 0,68 - - - - 
Company 
characteristics 
Innovative 3,04 44,98 0,94 26,27 0,78 29,75 6,85 31,22 
Firm age 8,12            20,03            20,90            12,55            
Team size 33,82            5,30            8,07            11,82            
Campaign 
characteristics 
Equity offering 0,39 6,31 0,34 0,89 0,24 1,21 0,46 3,17 
Exit 5,92            0,55            0,96            2,71            
Investor 
characteristics 
Serial investor 18,88 18,88 56,51 56,51 44,82 44,82 52,35 52,35 
Group Variable 
Owen value 




Ind. %R2 Group %R2 Ind. %R2 Group %R2 Ind. %R2 Group %R2 
Similarity 
Gender similarity 28,73 42,12 5,35 30,07 6,04 16,29 14,19 19,98 
Ethnic similarity 0,71            3,03            2,20            3,10            
Gender & Ethnic similarity 12,68            21,69            8,04            2,69            
Company 
characteristics 
Innovative 2,20 40,64 7,25 34,40 0,42 25,52 5,14 25,28 
Firm age 8,86            2,95            21,29            14,19            
Team size 29,58            24,20            3,81            5,94            
Campaign 
characteristics 
Equity offering 0,84 6,24 0,17 4,61 0,43 1,26 0,60 2,62 
Exit 5,40            4,44            0,83            2,02            
Investor 
characteristics 
Serial investor 11,01 11,01 30,92 30,92 56,94 56,94 52,13 52,13 
 
Note: Under the general equation of (2), this table reports the fraction of the overall R-squared (per cent), explained by the different groups of characteristics  – Owen value (Gr) -  and the 
individual share (Ind) of the overall R-squared (per cent) associated with each variable belonging to a specific characteristic (Shapley decomposition). Note that these figures are median values 
within bootstrap percentile confidence intervals (level of confidence: 90%). This explains cases where Total is not always 100.00. 
Results are showed for the sub-sample of female investors (Mod. 2) and male investors (Mod. 3), for the sub-sample of dominant investors (Mod. 4), for minority investors (Mod. 5) and the 
combination of gender and ethinicty of the investors: female investors that belong to the dominant ethnicity (Mod. 6), female investors that belong to the minority ethnicity (Mod. 7); male 
investors that belong to the dominant ethnicity (Mod. 8) and male investors that belong to the minority ethnicity (Mod.9).  
Year fixed effects are not included. 
The following company characteristics are included in the regression: Firm age is the the numbers of years from the firm’s establishment to the date of the campaign, Innovative is a dummy 
variable equals one in case of companies active in highly innovative sectors, Team size computed  as the log of number of people listed on the site to make up the group of executive around the 
entrepreneur. Two campaign structure characteristics are included as follows: Equity offering is the percentage of equity offered during the campaign, Exit is a dummy variable equals 1 if the 
exit strategy is explicit in the campaign and zero otherwise. The variables related to the entrepreneur characteristics are the following: At least one female proponent is a dummy variable equals 
1 in case of at least one female proponents among the overall numbers of proponents and zero otherwise, At least one ethnic minority proponent is a dummy variable equals 1 in case of at 
least one ethnic minority proponents among the overall numbers of proponents and zero otherwise. Variables related to the investor characteristics: Serial investor is a dummy variable equal to 
1 for serial investors and zero for otherwise. Similarity effects rest on three variables: gender similarity effect - Gender similarity - is a dummy variable equals 1 in case of gender similarity 
between backers and proponents, ethnical similarity effect - Ethnic similarity - is a dummy variable equals 1 when backers and proponents share the same ethnicity and the interaction between 
ethnic and gender similarity - Gender similarity & Ethnic similarity - is a dummy variable equals 1 in case of gender and ethnic similarity between backers and proponents.  
  
 
Table 8 – Similarity effect by gender and ethnicity groups of non-serial investors 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 









Gender similarity -0.037 -0.801*** 0.417*** -0.225** 0.330* -0.821*** -1.114*** 0.144 0.949*** 
 
(0.092) (0.199) (0.113) (0.111) (0.171) (0.240) (0.362) (0.135) (0.210) 
Ethnic similarity -0.065 0.149 -0.150 -0.438*** 0.757*** 0.012 -0.204 -0.737*** 1.479*** 
 
(0.099) (0.150) (0.143) (0.111) (0.268) (0.163) (0.492) (0.161) (0.352) 
Interaction [gender & ethnic 
similarity] 
0.222* 0.049 0.294* 0.428*** -0.252 -0.218 3.302*** 0.750*** -1.343*** 
(0.114) (0.257) (0.157) (0.131) (0.326) (0.296) (0.758) (0.181) (0.413) 
At least one female 
proponent 
-0.602***   -0.693*** -0.387**     
(0.076)   (0.084) (0.181)     
At least one ethnic minority 
proponent 
0.377*** 0.464** 0.332***       
(0.079) (0.183) (0.088)       
Innovative -0.102 -0.064 -0.104 -0.072 -0.384* -0.077 -0.282 -0.083 -0.395* 
 
(0.082) (0.181) (0.093) (0.089) (0.217) (0.191) (0.590) (0.101) (0.232) 
Firm age 0.133*** 0.068*** 0.153*** 0.139*** 0.102*** 0.079*** 0.028 0.160*** 0.131*** 
 
(0.012) (0.025) (0.014) (0.013) (0.030) (0.026) (0.066) (0.015) (0.034) 
Team size 0.300*** 0.181 0.357*** 0.351*** 0.128 0.277** -0.055 0.440*** 0.336** 
 
(0.056) (0.132) (0.064) (0.060) (0.149) (0.140) (0.359) (0.071) (0.166) 
Equity offering 0.257 0.474 0.303 0.531 0.188 1.268 0.502 0.557 0.381 
 
(0.343) (0.927) (0.378) (0.370) (0.878) (1.010) (2.462) (0.409) (0.951) 
Exit 0.785*** 1.233*** 0.719*** 0.908*** -0.195 1.262*** -0.278 0.867*** -0.061 
 
(0.164) (0.328) (0.186) (0.167) (0.646) (0.336) (0.736) (0.192) (0.653) 
Constant 5.513*** 5.485*** 5.010*** 5.739*** 5.458*** 5.396*** 5.544*** 5.275*** 4.659*** 
 
(0.133) (0.277) (0.155) (0.153) (0.295) (0.333) (0.682) (0.174) (0.352) 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6,074 1,381 4,693 5,000 1,074 1,164 217 3,836 857 
R-squared 0.083 0.116 0.075 0.082 0.103 0.123 0.199 0.075 0.114 
Adj. R-squared 0.0809 0.109 0.0731 0.0796 0.0926 0.115 0.160 0.0723 0.102 
 
Notes: This table reports the results of a OLS regression. The dependent variable is the log of amount invested by the individual investor in a single campaign for the overall sample (Mod. 1), for 
the sub-sample of female investors (Mod. 2) and male investors (Mod. 3), for the sub-sample of dominant investors (Mod. 4), for minority investors (Mod. 5) and the combination of gender and 
ethinicty of the investors: female investors that belong to the dominant ethnicity (Mod. 6), female investors that belong to the minority ethnicity (Mod. 7); male investors that belong to the 
dominant ethnicity (Mod. 8) and male investors that belong to the minority ethnicity (Mod.9) . The following company features’ controls are included in the regression: Firm age is the the 
numbers of years from the firm’s establishment to the date of the campaign, Innovative is a dummy variable equals one in case of companies active in highly innovative sectors, Team size 
computed  as the log of number of people listed on the site to make up the group of executive around the entrepreneur. Two campaign structure controls are included as follows: Equity offering 
is the percentage of equity offered during the campaign, Exit is a dummy variable equals 1 if the exit strategy is explicit in the campaign and zero otherwise. The control variables related to the 
entrepreneur characteristics are the following: At least one female proponent is a dummy variable equals 1 in case of at least one female proponents among the overall numbers of proponents 
and zero otherwise, At least one ethnic minority proponent is a dummy variable equals 1 in case of at least one ethnic minority proponents among the overall numbers of proponents and zero 
otherwise. Variables related to the investor profile is Serial investor is a dummy variable equal to 1 for serial investors and zero for otherwise. Similarity effect rest on three variables: gender 
similarity effect - Gender similarity - is a dummy variable equals 1 in case of gender similarity between backers and proponents, ethnical similarity effect - Ethnic similarity - is a dummy 
variable equals 1 when backers and proponents share the same ethnicity and the interaction between ethnic and gender similarity - Gender similarity & Ethnic similarity - is a dummy variable 
equals 1 in case of gender and ethnic similarity between backers and proponents.All models include year-fixed effect dummies. The standard errors are robust and clustered around investors and 
are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
  
Table 9 – Shapley and Owen value decomposition of R2 by non-serial investors characteristics 
Group Variable 
  Owen value 
All Female Male Dominant Minority 
Ind. %R2 Group %R2 








Gender similarity 5.41 11.38 31.07 41.20 21.16 33.19 4.58 11.97 12.18 19.24 
Ethnic similarity 0.97  1.53  2.58  1.39  4.76  
Gender similarity & Ethnic 
similarity 
0.14  
8.60  9.45  5.99  2.31  
Enrepreneuer 
characteristics 
At least one female 
proponent 
30.26 31.45 
 3.04  0.87 33.83 33.83 15.25 15.25 
At least one ethnic minority 
proponent 
1.20  
3.04  0.87      
Company 
characteristics 
Innovative 3.29 54.78 4.27 49.09 2.76 63.13 2.52 51.56 9.70 62.08 
Firm age 35.42  8.83  49.99  36.47  25.39  
Team size 16.06  35.99  10.38  12.56  26.99  
Campaign 
characteristics 
Equity offering 0.42 2.39 0.37 6.66 0.84 2.80 0.47 2.63 0.46 3.42 
Exit 1.97  6.29  1.95  2.16  2.96  
Group Variable 
  Owen value 








Ind. %R2 Group %R2 Ind. %R2 Group %R2 
Similarity 
Gender similarity   35.09 54.04 9.30 63.19 16.40 34.86 34.38 51.58 
Ethnic similarity   0.96  5.59  4.59  9.19  
Gender & Ethnic similarity   17.97  48.30  13.87  8.01  
Company 
characteristics 
Innovative   3.66 40.01 4.97 30.15 1.99 61.17 7.13 46.61 
Firm age   8.16  3.99  52.31  26.54  
Team size   28.19  21.19  6.86  12.94  
Campaign 
characteristics 
Equity offering   0.65 5.95 0.22 6.65 1.14 3.97 0.43 1.81 
Exit   5.30  6.43  2.83  1.38  
 
Note: Under the general equation of (2), this table reports the fraction of the overall R-squared (per cent), explained by the different groups of characteristics  – Owen value (Gr) -  and the 
individual share (Ind) of the overall R-squared (per cent) associated with each variable belonging to a specific characteristic (Shapley decomposition). Note that these figures are median values 
within bootstrap percentile confidence intervals (level of confidence: 90%). This explains cases where Total is not always 100.
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